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The monitoring role of female directors over accounting quality 
 
Abstract 
Recent research in accounting suggests female directors exert more stringent monitoring over the 
financial reporting process than their male counterparts. However, an emerging literature in 
finance and economics provides mixed findings and questions whether females in leadership 
roles significantly differ from their male counterparts. Building on this literature, we re-examine 
the link between the presence of female directors, gender biases, and financial statements quality. 
Using a large sample of UK firms we find that a larger percentage of women among independent 
directors is significantly associated with lower earnings management practices. However, we 
show that this relation disappears if we focus on firms that do not discriminate against women in 
the access to directorships. Finally, we provide evidence that gender biases are associated with 
lower earnings quality. We interpret our results as consistent with (1) prior evidence that males 
and females do not differ substantially when performing the same role in highly specialized 
positions, and with (2) discrimination being an important factor explaining the association 
between female directors and accounting quality.  
 
Keywords:  Gender diversity, board of directors, accounting quality, earnings management, 
corporate governance. 
JEL codes:  M41, G34, J16, J71 
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1. Introduction 
The role and effectiveness of women in corporate boards has garnered increased attention. This 
growing interest stems from the acknowledgment that women have been historically 
underrepresented in high profile jobs. This is the case of corporate directorships (Bilimoria and 
Piderit, 1994; Westphal and Stern, 2006, 2007), positions in biomedical research (Wenneras and 
Wold, 1997), or in leading symphony orchestras (Goldin and Rouse, 2000). 
Recent regulations echo the concern that discrimination may exist in accessing 
directorships, leading to inefficient utilization of the talent pool. Thus, they recommend 
increasing the number of female directors in corporate boards. A number of these legislations 
explicitly argue that gender diversity improves board effectiveness. However, an emerging 
literature questions the view that female directors behave differently than their male counterparts 
(see, e.g., Adams and Funk, 2012; Sila et al., 2016), and asks for further research into the role of 
women on boards that can disentangle the confounding effect of discrimination. 
Consistent with the existence of confounding factors, the evidence linking the presence of 
female directors with various measures of firm value, risk or performance is generally mixed 
(Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Carter et al., 2003, 2010; Erhardt et al., 2003; Gul et al., 2011; Rose, 
2007; Sila et al. 2016), with a number of studies indicating that female directors behave 
differently than their male counterparts particularly in terms of risk-aversion (e.g., Levi et al., 
2014) or dividend payout policies (Chen et al. 2017), and suggesting lower performance in firms 
with greater board diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). However, the literature studying gender 
diversity and financial reporting quality systematically reports positive consequences. We 
contribute to this area by developing and testing alternative explanations for this positive link 
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between accounting quality and women on corporate boards, building on the advances in the 
recent literature in economics and finance. 
The aforementioned prior work in accounting generally argues that differences in behavior 
across male and female CEOs, CFOs, or directors exist, concluding that females are better 
monitors than males (Barua et al., 2010; Clatworthy and Peel, 2013; Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; 
Peni and Vahamaa, 2010; Srinidhi et al., 2011). The support for this prediction comes from 
different strands of literature that suggest that, in the general population, females differ from 
males. These strands of literature include behavioral studies (women being more risk averse, less 
overconfident, and exhibiting more independent thinking), ethics (women being more ethical), 
and organizational theory (women improving deliberations and promoting communication).
1
  
Against this backdrop, an emerging literature asks the question of whether these 
differences found in the general population can be extrapolated to leadership positions. Some 
recent research appears to suggest so. For example, the work of Levi et al. (2010, 2014) suggests 
that firms with female CEOs and more female directors engage in less aggressive acquisitions, as 
measured by their lower propensity to initiate acquisition bids, and lower size of the bid 
premiums, while the work of Faccio et al. (2016) provides evidence that firms managed by 
female CEOs have less volatile earnings, lower leverage and engage in lower overall corporate 
risk-taking. In related research, Huang and Kisgen (2013) study financial and investment 
decisions and conclude that male CEOs undertake more acquisitions and issue more debt than 
female CEOs, concluding that male CEOs exhibit overconfidence in corporate decision-making 
relative to female CEOs. In contrast to this literature that suggests gender differences also apply 
to leadership positions, the early work of Eagly and Johnson (1990) shows that women and men 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Agnew et al. (2003), Barber and Odean (2001), Beyer (1990), Gneezy et al. (2003), Lundeberg et al. 
(1994), Nosek et al. (2009). 
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who perform the same organizational role tend to behave in a similar way. Croson and Gneezy 
(2009), in their literature review, argue that gender differences in preferences including risk 
taking and overconfidence do not apply to women in managerial positions and Gneezy et al. 
(2009) show that gender differences are driven by social aspects and not predetermined. In 
related work, Deaves et al. (2009) show that in the specialized fields of economics, finance and 
business, men are not more overconfident than females, and argue that women in these 
disciplines may be different from those in the general population.
2
 The work of Sila et al. (2016), 
building on the arguments and findings in Deaves et al. (2009) also fails to find evidence of 
lower risk taking in firms with greater female board representation, while Bugeja et al. (2012) 
fail to find differences in CEO compensation across genders, which they interpret as consistent 
with women not being differently risk-averse or less willing to accept performance-based 
compensation relative to men. Finally, Adams and Funk (2012, p. 221) analyze whether ‘women 
in leadership positions are different from “typical” women in the population,’ and conclude that 
women in leadership positions do not satisfy gender stereotypes. Indeed, they show that female 
directors are more risk loving than their male colleagues, a finding that contradicts common 
rhetoric on gender differences in risk-taking. This finding is revisited and confirmed by Adams 
and Ragunathan (2015), who study risk-taking in the banking industry during the crisis and show 
that, conditional on being in the finance industry, women are not more risk-averse than men.  
Given the above discussion, gender differences may not apply to leadership roles. 
However, even if gender differences do not exist in leadership positions, we expect that 
discrimination against women can create an association between the monitoring role of the board 
                                                 
2
 Similarly, the work of Sapienza et al. (2009) suggests that inherent biological differences between males and 
females, such as testosterone levels, influence the likelihood of entering the finance field, but that amongst those 
with high testosterone, whether male or female, no observable differences exist in risk aversion. The more general 
evidence in Hyde et al. (2008) indicates that differences in math and science abilities between genders are trivial. 
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and the presence of female directors. Albeit the literature in this area is scarce, there is prior 
evidence consistent with gender discrimination in accessing directorships (Bilimoria and Piderit, 
1994; Farrel and Hersch, 2005). For example, Sila et al. (2016) show that female directors are 
more likely to be appointed if they replace another female, and less likely to be appointed to 
boards that have a greater pre-existent proportion of females. This is consistent with gender 
biases (as under no discrimination, these variables should not explain appointments). Consistent 
but indirect evidence is presented also by studies that systematically report the unexpectedly high 
number of firms with either no females or with a single female on their boards (see, e.g., Srinidhi 
et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2011). If better governed firms are less likely to discriminate, and higher 
quality boards positively influence financial statements quality,
3
 gender biases may create a 
positive association between gender diversity and accounting quality.  
Thus, we expect that absent discrimination, there should be no association between gender 
diversity in corporate boards and accounting quality. Second, we expect that if a gender effect 
exists, it is driven by discrimination against women. Our predictions are consistent with the 
previously discussed work that suggests that once the process of female directors’ appointment is 
controlled for, male and female directors behave similarly in leadership roles.  
To test our predictions, we use a large UK sample for the period 2003-2012 and study the 
links between board gender diversity and earnings management. Our analyses yield the 
following key findings. First, we find that, similar to their male counterparts, the influence of 
female directors over the monitoring process hinges crucially on whether they are independent. 
We find that firms with a larger percentage of women among independent directors show 
                                                 
3
See, e.g., Armstrong et al. (2014), Beekes et al. (2004), García Lara et al. (2009), Klein (2002), Peasnell et al. 
(2005), and Xie et al. (2003). 
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improved accounting numbers. We do not find this result in firms with a larger percentage of 
women among executive directors. In our second set of tests, we separately study discriminating 
versus non-discriminating firms. In non-discriminating firms, we find that the presence of female 
independent directors is not associated with better accounting numbers. Consistent with this 
finding, we also show that financial reporting is of lower quality in discriminating firms. Overall, 
our evidence supports the predictions that, first, absent discrimination, males and females in 
leadership roles behave similarly and, second, that discrimination in the access to directorships 
mediates the relation between female directors and accounting quality. Our results are consistent 
with Rose (2007), and particularly, with Sila et al. (2016) and challenge prior work in 
accounting. In particular, our results suggest that controlling for gender biases in board 
appointment procedures is important to understand the economic effects of female directors.  
We contribute to prior literature by providing new evidence that adds to the increasingly 
accepted view that women in high profile jobs perform their duties similarly than their male 
counterparts. We also contribute to the literature by providing a review of how gender biases 
may impact on the effectiveness of female directors’ monitoring that has testable implications for 
future research. The main implication of our results is that prior evidence of a positive female 
contribution to board monitoring effectiveness must be interpreted with caution, as it might be 
driven by discrimination against women in the access to corporate board seats. Our results 
certainly invite to reconsider some of the prior extant evidence, and are consistent with the work 
of Eagly and Johnson (1990), Croson and Gneezy (2009), Adams and Funk (2012), Adams and 
Ragunathan (2015), and Sila et al. (2016) who show that observed behavioral differences across 
genders do not apply to high profile positions.  
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2. Female directors and the monitoring role of the board 
Corporate governance encompasses all the processes and mechanisms that guarantee firms are 
managed in the interests of their stakeholders. The board of directors is at the centre of this 
decision-making and control system (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Young, 2000). Next, we discuss 
the expected association between female directors and accounting quality both in the absence 
and in the presence of gender biases in the appointment of directors. 
2.1. Female directors and accounting quality in the absence of discrimination 
Against an agency theory backdrop, corporate governance provisions are beneficial if they 
decrease agency costs. Consequently, one way through which the presence of women directors 
can contribute to increase firm value is through improvements in the monitoring effectiveness of 
the board. To study if female directors perform this monitoring role differently than their male 
counterparts, we focus on the financial reporting system, as it is expected to improve 
significantly through better monitoring. Directors’ influence is predicted to hinge crucially on 
whether they have (1) sufficient knowledge to understand how managerial decisions influence 
accounting numbers; and (2) incentives to monitor management (Beekes et al., 2004).  
Characteristics of directors’ functional backgrounds, such as financial expertise or tenure 
can be more intuitively linked to their knowledge and ability to understand how managerial 
decisions affect accounting numbers and therefore, to the detection of managerial attempts to 
manage earnings. However, purely demographic attributes such as gender or race are less clearly 
associated with directors’ knowledge, especially regarding the financial reporting system. With 
respect to the incentives to monitor, these are linked to whether the director is independent. 
Independence, as defined in corporate governance codes, is unlikely to systematically differ 
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across genders.
4
 Despite this, several recent studies suggest gender diversity on the board may 
influence a number of firm outcomes (e.g., Levi et al., 2014; Faccio et al., 2016), including 
accounting quality (Srinidhi et al., 2011). However, consistent with the aforementioned lack of 
arguments on gender differences in knowledge and incentives, a growing body of research 
questions that gender differences found in the general population can be extrapolated to 
leadership positions or to positions in the specialized fields of economics, finance and business 
(Adams and Funk, 2012; Adams and Ragunathan, 2015; Bugeja et al., 2012; Deaves et al., 2009; 
Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Gneezy et al., 2009; Sila et al., 2016). 
This discussion leads us to our first prediction. We expect that, if we take as constant 
directors’ skills and knowledge, their decisions related to the financial reporting process will be 
equal regardless of their gender and only explained by differences in incentives. And thus, absent 
discrimination, we expect that gender diversity on the board has no impact on accounting quality.  
An ample literature shows that independent directors positively influence accounting 
quality (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2014; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et al. 2003). 
Consistent with this literature, if male and female directors behave similarly and there is no 
discrimination, only the proportion of independent directors (of any gender) should influence 
accruals quality.
5
 However, the process of hiring a new board member is not gender neutral 
(Farrel and Hersch, 2005), and prior work suggests that there is discrimination against women, 
tokenism and stereotyping. As argued by Mateos de Cabo et al. (2011) the effects of female 
                                                 
4
 Corporate governance codes generally link directors’ independence to whether the director (1) is or has been an 
employee of the firm, (2) maintains or has maintained in the past business relations with the firm, (3) receives 
additional compensation from the firm, apart from the director’s fee, (4) has family ties with any interested party to 
the firm, or (5) represents a significant shareholder. 
5
 This prediction is consistent with Eagly and Johnson (1990), Croson and Gneezy (2009), and Rose (2007), who 
shows that in boards with low diversity, members of the board that are unlike the majority are socialized to think and 
act like the majority. 
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directors cannot be properly measured without controlling for gender biases (discrimination). 
Next, we describe how these biases likely impact on board monitoring. 
2.2. Female directors and accounting quality in the presence of discrimination  
Prior work suggests that there are gender biases in the appointment of directors (Bilimoria and 
Piderit, 1994; Farrel and Hersch, 2005), and that recruitment processes favor men and are not 
based only on the grounds of the candidate’s skills. Even controlling for experience and 
education, men have more probabilities of being elected for board membership. Also, there is 
evidence that women directors are not paid equally for doing the same work (Kulich et al., 
2011), and that they are more likely to be appointed if they substitute another woman (e.g., Sila 
et al., 2016). If recruitment processes are gender biased, an association may exist between firms 
with a larger percentage of women serving on the board and the quality of accounting numbers.  
Discrimination may lead to a positive association between the presence of female 
independent directors and the quality of accounting numbers through at least three channels. 
First, biases against women might create a better (larger) pool of available female candidates for 
directorships, permitting firms that do not discriminate to choose the most talented candidates, 
who would positively influence accounting quality. Second, given the barriers that women have 
to overcome to become directors, the ones that succeed could be better prepared and likely to 
exert greater effort than their male counterparts. This greater effort can be partly explained by 
higher reputational concerns and being subject to greater scrutiny (Lee and James, 2007). Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) report that women directors have better attendance records to board meetings 
(consistent with women exerting greater effort), and that CEO tenure is shorter in firms with 
more female directors, which they interpret as underperforming CEOs being removed from their 
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positions quicker in these firms (consistent with increased monitoring by female directors). 
Finally and perhaps more likely, the presence of female directors may be a proxy for the quality 
of the firm governance structure. Better governed firms are likely to have better nomination 
systems/committees that choose directors according to merit and against objective criteria (e.g., 
Hutchinson et al., 2015). If better governed firms provide higher quality accounting numbers 
(Armstrong et al., 2014) and do not discriminate in the appointment of directors, this would lead 
to a positive association between the percentage of female independent directors and accounting 
quality. However, this association would not necessarily imply causality; it would be the result of 
firms with a larger percentage of female directors having also other governance provisions that 
improve the financial reporting process. The findings of Chen et al. (2017) support this plausible 
relevance of corporate governance mechanisms, as they report gender diversity effects only in 
firms with weak governance. 
The alternative view also has some merit, and given discrimination, female directors may 
in fact be worse monitors if, for example, they have less expertise (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012) or 
lower incentives to monitor (Westphal and Stern, 2007). Research on resource dependence and 
institutional theories shows that board selection procedures are not gender neutral and that firms 
increase the percentage of female directors to match the demographic characteristics of their 
employees, in a search for legitimacy or to meet regulators’ and societal expectations (Blum et 
al., 1994; Farrel and Hersch, 2005; Hillman et al., 2007; Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). Also 
indicative of this institutional role is that female directors are less influential and are paid less 
(Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004; Bilimoria and Piderit, 2007). When hiring female directors is 
an affirmative action and not a search for value, this might lead to inefficient hiring (Holzer and 
Neumark, 1999, 2000). For example, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Matsa and Miller (2013) 
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show that the introduction of mandated gender quotas on boards can have negative effects on 
firm value and performance. Thus, ultimately, the effect of discrimination on accounting quality 
is an empirical question of interest. 
 
3. Methods and data 
Gender biases in the appointment of directors may affect the association between female 
directors and the quality of monitoring. Overall, we expect that discrimination leads to lower 
accounting quality. Also, we expect that once we control for the confounding effects of these 
gender biases, women directors perform their monitoring role similarly than their male 
counterparts. Next, we describe the tests conducted to understand the links between female 
directors, gender biases and monitoring (as measured by accounting quality). 
3.1. Main model (without controls for gender biases) 
To test our predictions, we regress a measure of accounting quality (ABS_DAX) on the 
percentage of women among independent directors and controls. The model is as follows: 
ABS_DAXj,t = + 1Fem_in_NEDj,t + 2NEDj,t + 3BSizeDumj,t +  
+ 4Dir.Qualificationsj,t + 5Dir. Appointmentsj,t + 6ROAj,t +  
+ 7FirmSizej,t + 8MTBj,t  + 9LossDummyj,t +   
+ 10SmallProfitj,t + 11DivPayOutj,t+ ∑Yeart+ uj,t          (1) 
Where ABS_DAX is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the Dechow et 
al. (1995) model. Larger values of ABS_DAX indicate more pronounced earnings management 
practices and lower accounting quality. Fem_in_NED is the percentage of women among 
independent directors. The main coefficient of interest is 1. Absent discrimination, we expect 1 
to be insignificant. However, if gender biases exist, 1 will be significant. Model (1) is estimated 
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using ordinary least squares. In the spirit of Petersen (2009), and to control for heteroskedasticity 
and cross-sectional dependence problems, we cluster the standard errors at the firm level. We do 
not cluster at the year level as the model incorporates year indicator variables. 
To better understand whether it is gender that matters, or whether it is the role of the 
director as independent or executive, we additionally estimate model (1) using three alternative 
main explanatory variables: a) the % of female independent directors over all directors 
(independent or executives), b) the % of female directors over all directors, and c) the % of 
female executive directors over all directors. Our expectation is that, given that only independent 
directors have incentives to monitor, the presence of female executive directors will not be 
associated with lower earnings management. To the extent however that females are inherently 
different (for example, more ethical) and alter board dynamics, the presence of females on the 
board, irrespective of their role, would impact accounting quality.  
Controls include the following corporate governance characteristics: (1) NED, the number 
of independent directors over the total number of directors; and (2) BSizeDum, a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if board size is between 5 and 12 directors, 0 otherwise. Consistent with 
prior evidence (Armstrong et al., 2014; Klein, 2002), we expect that firms with a larger 
percentage of independent directors will present lower absolute discretionary accruals. We also 
expect that monitoring will suffer in firms with unusually small or large boards (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2008; Higgs, 2003), leading to greater earnings management. We also control 
for the qualifications and networks of board members by including (3) Dir. Qualifications, which 
controls for directors’ skills and knowledge and is defined as the average number of 
qualifications at undergraduate level and above for all the members of the board; and (4) Dir. 
Appointments, which controls for the number of other board seats held by firm directors, and is 
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defined as the mean number of other board appointments of the members of the Board. By 
including these controls, we ensure that it is not directors’ differential skills and abilities that 
may drive our findings.  
We also control for: profitability as measured by firm return-on-assets (ROA), as poor 
performance is one of the main drivers of manipulation, and, as shown in Kothari et al. (2005) is 
likely to drive discretionary accruals; Firm size as measured by Total Assets (a proxy for political 
pressures, which are expected to be greater for large, more visible firms as argued in Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986); the market-to-book ratio (MTB), as Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that 
growth firms have additional incentives to conceal poor performance, and McNichols (2000) 
argue that one should control for growth in discretionary accruals model to capture actual 
discretionary behavior; Loss_Dummy, a dummy variable identifying firms with losses, as prior 
work, starting with Beaver (1966), shows that firms in distress manipulate accounting reports, 
and also detecting earnings management for firms with losses, especially if they are close to 
financial distress (Beneish, 1997) can be more complicated; SmallProfit, a dummy variable 
identifying firms with very small profits (less than one per cent of total assets), which is a 
potential sign of earnings manipulation, as shown by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Hansen 
(2010); and the dividend pay-out ratio (dividend policies also create pressures for accounting 
manipulation, as shown by Daniel et al., 2008). Finally, we incorporate year dummies (Year). 
3.1.1. Analysis of firms that do not discriminate in the access to directorships 
As we describe at length in Section 2, we expect that the association between accounting quality 
and gender board diversity is influenced by the existence of discrimination against current and 
future female directors. To study the effect of gender biases we proceed as follows. We use three 
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simple strategies to identify firms that do not discriminate against women in the access to board 
seats. With these strategies, we create three sub-samples (I, II and III) where we expect gender 
biases to be less pronounced. Absent gender biases, male and female directors are chosen based 
on merit and therefore, they are expected to be similar in their knowledge and incentives, and 
thus, to behave similarly. Using these samples, we can test in a cleaner setting whether, absent 
discrimination, female directors behave differently than male directors.  
The first identification strategy that we use is naïve, in the sense that we identify as non-
discriminating all firms that have a female director at least once during our sample period 
(discriminating firms are then those firms that never have a female director throughout the entire 
sample period). This means that within the subsample of non-discriminating firms we have a 
number of firms for which in some years they have female directors, and in some years they have 
not. We label this identification strategy as sample I, and it is our least restrictive strategy. As a 
second naïve strategy, we follow a similar approach, but applied at the firm-year level instead of 
at the firm level, and identify as non-discriminating firm-year observations with at least one 
female director. This strategy is labeled as sample II and means that a single firm could be 
classified as discriminating in some years (when the firm has no female directors) and as non-
discriminating in other years (when the firm has female directors.) 
Admittedly, strategies I and II could be misclassifying some firms that discriminate (and 
for example, incur in tokenism) as non-discriminating. We address this concern with our third 
strategy, and also, in additional tests where we focus on cases where the firm has only one 
female director on the board. In our final identification strategy, we model the decision to 
appoint women directors to obtain an ex-ante probability of female presence on the board, which 
we can then compare to actual female presence. To build our model we follow Blum et al. 
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(1994), Hillman et al. (2007) and Srinidhi et al. (2011), who find that the main organizational 
predictors of women on corporate boards are firm and board size as well as industry 
membership. Hillman et al. (2007) follow the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) in arguing that 
‘larger and more visible organizations experience more pressure to conform to societal 
expectations’ (p. 944). Given societal pressures to increase the number of female directors, they 
expect larger firms to appoint more women directors than smaller firms. Regarding industry 
type, they argue that firms with a larger percentage of female employees will find that including 
female directors contributes to increase the legitimacy of the board’s decisions before the eyes of 
the employees. Consequently, they expect firms with a larger percentage of female employees to 
be more likely to hire female directors. Industry characteristics are thus particularly important, as 
prior research shows that specific skills intensity occupations across sectors are associated with 
board diversity (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2016). We use the following logit model: 
Womenj,t = + 1FirmSizej,t + 2BoardSizej,t+ 3FemaleEmploymentj,t +  
  + 4Regj,t + 5FirmAgej,t + 6MTBj,t+ 7ROAj,t+    
  + 8Retj,t + 9ConcentrationRatioj,t+  ∑Yeart + uj,t          (2) 
where Women is a dummy variable that takes value one if there is at least one woman 
(independent or executive) on the board of directors and zero otherwise, FirmSize is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization, BoardSize is the number of directors on the board (larger 
boards are more likely to include women),
6
 FemaleEmployment is the percentage of female 
employees in each industry/year, as reported by the UK Statistics Authority, Reg is a dummy 
variable identifying regulated industries, which are more likely to include women for 
political/visibility issues. Following Hillman et al. (2007) we include as additional control 
                                                 
6
 Model (1) includes a dummy variable to control for board size (BSizeDum). In model (2), following Hillman et al. 
(2007), we use a continuous variable. Both the percentage of female directors and BSizeDum have low firm-level 
variation, thus, the inclusion of BSizeDum in model (2) lowers variation in our independent variables. However, as a 
robustness test, we use BSizeDum in models (1) and (2) and repeat the main analyses. Our inferences are unchanged. 
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variables: (i) a proxy for organizational age, (ii) the market-to-book ratio, (iii) accounting and 
non-accounting based proxies for performance (ROA and the market rate of return), as the 
literature on ‘the glass cliff’ shows that less profitable firms are more likely to hire females for 
their management teams (Haslam and Ryan, 2008; Ryan and Haslam, 2005, 2007), (iv) the 
industry concentration ratio, and (v) dummy variables to account for year effects.
7
 
Using model (2) we estimate the firm-year probability of female board presence. In our 
third identification strategy, we consider non-discriminating observations those with at least one 
woman sitting on the board and also those observations without female directors but with a low 
probability of having women on the board given their characteristics. This means that some firm-
year observations without female directors are classified as non-discriminating in sample III.
8
  
3.1.2. Accruals quality proxy 
We use a widely accepted and extensively used measure of earnings management (the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals), as a proxy for accounting quality. We use accruals models to 
estimate discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (2010: 351) argue that the ‘use of these models has 
become the accepted methodology in accounting to capture discretion.’ These models assume 
that the normal level of accruals for a given firm is determined by changes in the operational 
activities of the firm (changes in sales, which will lead to different levels of basic working 
                                                 
7
 In additional analyses, we add industry fixed effects (FE) to model (2). However, several of the explanatory 
variables in model (2), based on Hillman et al. (2007), capture industry characteristics, and thus, the inclusion of 
industry FE weakens our approach. Regardless, if we estimate models (2) and (1) using industry FE in model (1), 
our main inferences remain unchanged, although the construction of sample III is slightly different and model (2) 
underestimates the probability of having female directors, leading to a sample III closer to sample I than the one 
reported in our main tests. 
8
 First, we classify as non-discriminating firms with a) no female directors and b) a low probability of having 
women on the board (≤ 10%). This choice identifies a small number of non-discriminating firms, and, thus, 
minimizes the probability of type II error. Our inferences are not altered if we increase this cut-off point by 25%. As 
we increase it, the sample of non-discriminating firms increases substantially, which creates concerns of 
misclassifying firms. This is because the median probability is relatively low (27%). 
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capital accruals such as accounts payables or receivables), and by the level of property, plant and 
equipment needed to carry out the operations (that will lead to a certain level of long term 
accruals such as depreciation). Lower absolute values of discretionary accruals indicate a more 
transparent financial reporting system and more useful accounting numbers for stakeholders. 
We define discretionary accruals (DAX) as the prediction error of the modified Jones 
(1991) model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995). We calculate DAX using a two-stage approach. 
First, we use the standard Jones (1991) model as applied in cross-section to total accruals 
(TACC). We measure TACC as the change in non-cash working capital plus depreciation and 
amortization. We then regress TACC on the change in sales, and gross property, plant and 
equipment for each NACE2 2-digit industry-year, using all available data, but imposing the 
restriction of at least six observations per industry-year combination. The model is as follows: 
, , ,
, , , ,
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j t j t j t j t
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          (3) 
where TA is total assets, ΔREV is change in total sales and PPE is gross property plant and 
equipment. In the second stage, we use the industry-year ordinary least square parameter 
estimates from equation (3) to partition TACC into discretionary (DAX) and non-discretionary 
accruals. Non-discretionary accruals are the predicted part of TACC, while DAX are the residuals 
resulting from this regression. Hence, for each firm j, we calculate DAX as follows: 
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        (4) 
where ˆˆ ˆ, ,    are the fitted coefficients from equation (3) and ΔAR is the change in accounts 
receivable. We use the absolute value of DAX (ABS_DAX) as our measure of earnings quality. 
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Larger values of ABS_DAX indicate poorer earnings quality. Our inferences are also identical if 
we subtract change in receivables from the first stage and use those coefficients in model (4). 
As discussed by Armstrong et al. (2010), Dechow et al. (2010) and Owens et al. (2016) one 
common concern with accruals models is that if there are intra-industry differences in the 
accruals generating process, Jones-type models may classify these differences (driven by firm-
specific fundamental) as discretionary accruals, inflating the probability of finding cases of 
earnings management. To control for this possible measurement error, we include in Model (1) a 
wide set of explanatory variables that are expected to capture these intra-industry differences in 
economic fundamentals.  
3.2. Sample and data 
We collect data on board of directors’ characteristics of UK firms for the period 2003-2012 from 
BoardEx. The UK is an Anglo-American country with a business environment comparable to the 
US in terms of investor protection, legal tradition, and quality of accounting numbers (Leuz et 
al., 2003), although differences exist with respect to the depth of capital markets and also, 
liability exposure (Khurana and Raman, 2004). The UK provides an interesting setting for our 
tests, as it has a rich corporate governance tradition. Indeed, the Cadbury Report of 1992 is one 
of the earliest corporate governance codes issued in the world, and the first UK corporate 
governance regulation recommending an increase in the number of women directors is the Higgs 
(2003) report, issued over a decade later and marking the beginning of our sample. 
We merge these data with BvD Osiris accounting and stock prices information. We remove 
the top and bottom percentile of market returns, earnings, accruals and discretionary accruals. 
This leads to a final sample of 4,785 firm-year observations. This is a large fraction of the non-
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financial firms listed in the main market of the London Stock Exchange. Our sample is 
substantially larger and includes smaller companies than prior work on corporate governance 
characteristics of UK firms, which constrains the sample to FTSE 100 firms (Conyon and Peck, 
1998; Ryan and Haslam, 2005; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004) or to firms with December fiscal-
year ends (Beekes et al., 2004). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1 Panel A contains sample descriptive statistics. The average percentage of women 
sitting on boards is as low as 5.8%, while the median at three decimal digits is zero. The 
percentage of women among independent directors is also very low (5.6%, and the median is 
also zero).
9
 Table 1 Panel B shows that a significant proportion of firms have at least one female 
director, and this percentage has been increasing over time as depicted in Table 1 Panel B (from 
a minimum of 28% in 2004 to a maximum of 38% in 2012). These results are in line with 
previous research that also denounces the high degree of homogeneity in UK corporate elites 
(Conyon and Mallin 1997; Brammer et al., 2007). This also confirms that firm size appears to be 
an important determinant of the female presence on boards, as Singh and Vinnicombe (2004), 
who focus on the FTSE 100 firms, find that 61% of their sample firms had at least one woman on 
their boards. An important and interesting differential feature of our UK sample is that, while in 
prior US work (see, e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2011) women directors are almost all independent, in our 
sample, 37% of female directors are executives. That only 63% of women directors are 
independent in the UK (versus 95% in the US) indicates that both recruitment processes and the 
role played by female directors in the UK and in the US seems to be different. It also allows us to 
                                                 
9
 There are 42 firm-year observations without independent directors. In our tests, we set the value of Fem_in_NED 
for these observations equal to zero. If we exclude these observations, results are qualitatively identical. 
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examine the different links with the quality of the financial reporting system of female 
independent directors versus female executive directors, a novel analysis in this literature. 
The average percentage of non-executive directors is 53%, and the average number of 
directors is 6.6, also in line with previous work on UK boards (Peasnell et al., 2005). Accruals 
are on average negative, capturing the effect of depreciation and amortization, consistent with 
prior research. Finally, the mean absolute discretionary accruals represent an 8% of total assets, 
which is in line with prior research (for example, 7.7% in Klein, 2002). 
 
4. Main results 
Table 2 contains the correlation matrix. We find a significantly negative correlation between 
discretionary accruals and the percentage of non-executive directors. We also observe a 
significant negative correlation between ABS_DAX and: (1) the percentage of independent 
female directors among total board members (Fem_in_board), and (2) the percentage of women 
among independent directors (Fem_in_NED). Also, as predicted, Fem_in_board and 
Fem_in_NED are positively associated with Size and BoardSize, indicating that larger firms and 
firms with larger boards are more likely to include female directors in their boardrooms. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
In our first set of tests, we analyze the relation between earnings management and the 
percentage of women among independent directors, without considering the moderating effects 
of discrimination. This replicates much of the prior research in accounting. Table 3, column (a), 
contains the results of the estimation of model (1). The coefficient on Fem_in_NED is negative 
and significant (coeff=-0.019, t-stat= -1.80). As a robustness check, we also look at the 
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association between female independent directors over all directors and accounting quality. We 
also find a negative and significant relation (see Column (b), where coeff= -0.039, t-stat= -2.20). 
To fully understand the links between gender diversity and accounting quality, in Table 3 
we also report the results of estimating the main model considering as explanatory variables the 
percentage of women among all directors, and the percentage of women executive directors 
among all directors. To the extent that female directors are inherently different and, independent 
on their role, shift board dynamics in a way that enhances board monitoring ability, we should 
observe similar evidence when we consider these alternative variables. This definition of female 
presence also permits more direct comparisons with prior literature, as it is consistent with the 
work of Srinidhi et al. (2011) that, given limitations to the number of executive directors in their 
sample, focus their main tests on the presence of female directors (of any type).  
When we analyze the relation between the percentage of women on the board and earnings 
quality, without considering whether these women are executive or independent, we fail to find 
any relation (Column (c)). Similarly, when we consider only the presence of female executive 
directors, we do not find any effect on earnings quality (Column (d)). This is consistent with only 
independent directors having incentives to monitor senior managers, and suggests that 
controlling for the role of directors is important in gender-based studies of female presence on 
boards of directors. This evidence also suggests that female directors are not inherently different 
from their male counterparts and that when given the same job, they behave similarly.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Regarding the control variables, we find a significantly negative relation between 
ABS_DAX and the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board (NED). This is 
consistent with prior evidence showing that independent directors improve the quality of 
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earnings. We also find negative coefficients on BSizeDum and on Dir.Qualifications consistent 
with firms with too large or too small boards or with less qualified directors managing earnings 
more pronouncedly. This is in line with the recommendations in most governance codes and with 
the views in the academic literature (e.g., Jensen, 1993).  
In our second set of tests, we consider the role of gender discrimination. To do so, we 
replicate the main test (Table 3, Column (a)), but using three sub-samples of firms for which we 
do not expect discrimination against women in the access to directorships. We do not expect to 
find an association between female directors and accounting quality for these subsets of firms. 
To create the subsamples of non-discriminating firms, we use the previously explained 
strategies. Strategy I and II are straightforward to implement, as we identify as non-
discriminating those firms that have a female at least in one year during the sample period 
(sample I); and then, as those firm-year observations when there is a female director on the board 
(sample II). For our strategy III, we estimate model (2), a logit model where the presence of at 
least one female director is regressed on firm and board size, whether the firm operates in an 
industry where most employees are women, and controls. According to Hillman et al. (2007) 
these three characteristics are the main determinants of the presence of women on boards.
10
 The 
results from estimating model (2) are presented in Table 4. As expected, firm size, board size and 
female employment have odds ratios above one (1.15, 1.27 and 23.99, respectively), and the 
coefficients are significant. Regarding the control variables, it is interesting to note that the 
coefficient on market return is significantly negative. This is consistent with the ‘glass cliff’ 
                                                 
10
 We acknowledge there might be other characteristics of top management team composition and dynamics that we 
do not consider in our study and that could be important to understand board composition. This is an important 
avenue for future research, which should link the literature on corporate governance and accounting with the 
literature on top management team composition and team work at the upper echelons of organizations. For reviews 
of these streams of literature see Carpenter et al. (2004), Forbes and Milliken (1999), and Joshi and Roh (2009). 
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phenomenon (Haslam and Ryan, 2008; Ryan and Haslam, 2005, 2007), whereby women have a 
greater probability to be appointed to relevant positions in poorly performing firms. The results 
are not sensitive to the exclusion of any of the variables. In addition, and given the large number 
of explanatory variables, we ran OLS regressions to calculate variance inflation factors to be 
certain that results are not affected by multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors are always 
smaller than 4. Prior research suggests that values below 10 discard multicollinearity problems. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Next, we turn to the analyses of our three subsamples. Panel A of Table 5 contains 
descriptive statistics for the variable Fem_in_NED as well as for other key board characteristics, 
by sub-sample. For sample I (II), we identify 2,225 (1,552) non-discriminating firm-year 
observations, which account for 46% (32%) of our total sample. There is wide cross-sectional 
variation in Fem_in_NED, and even for these non-discriminating firms, the percentage of women 
among independent directors is quite low. We present, by subsample, a test of the differences in 
average board characteristics. As can be seen, systematically, firms considered as non-
discriminating (Non-Discr) have higher quality corporate governance than firms considered as 
discriminating (Discr). In particular, discriminating firms have lower board independence, a 
lower number of highly qualified directors, and directors on their boards are appointed to a lower 
number of additional board seats. They also have, by construction, lower gender diversity. 
Indeed, Fem_in_NED is zero in the discriminating samples, indicating the absence of 
independent female director in those firms.  
Table 5 Panel B contains details on the time-series distribution of firms classified as non-
discriminating and also, of average earnings quality as measured by ABS_DAX, where higher 
levels of ABS_DAX indicate lower accounting quality. Strikingly, out of the 30 differences 
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reported, 22 are negative, indicating that average ABS_DAX are greater in the discriminating 
firms (i.e., discriminating firms have lower quality earnings), and only 2 are positive. Overall, 
the descriptive evidence reported in Panels A and B of Table 5 strongly suggests that 
discriminating firms have both lower quality corporate governance and lower quality earnings. 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
Panel C of Table 5 contains the estimation of model (1) for the three sub-samples of non-
discriminating observations. In all three cases, the coefficient on Fem_in_NED is not significant 
at conventional levels (coeff= -0.002, t-stat= -0.14; coeff= -0.015, t-stat= -1.03 and coeff= -
0.018, t-stat= -1.30, for sample I, II and III). It is noteworthy that the coefficient of the 
percentage of independent directors (NED) is negative and significant in all three cases, as 
expected. However, this coefficient is not significant for the discriminating samples, which are 
also presented in Table 5, for full comparability. This is consistent with the descriptive evidence 
that already suggested that differences exist between discriminating and non-discriminating 
firms, and also, that our simple identification strategies split sample firms along important 
corporate governance characteristics and effects, suggesting that gender biases may indeed have 
important effects in the association between governance and accounting quality.  
In our final analysis, we focus on the non-discriminating samples and replicate the results 
of Table 5 Panel C using Fem_perct as our independent variable of interest. This is consistent 
with prior accounting research that does not consider the different roles of female directors (e.g., 
Srinidhi et al. 2011). To the extent that overall female presence improves monitoring, the effects 
of using this proxy could be stronger than the ones obtained for Fem_in_NED. The results from 
this test are presented in Table 6. Fem_perct is not significant in any of the three subsamples, 
while NED remains negative and significant. The evidence reported in Tables 5 and 6 questions 
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the findings in prior research, as once the focus is on non-discriminating firms, the association 
between female directors and accounting quality disappears. Our evidence is consistent with the 
work of Sila et al. (2016) who also fails to find evidence of female presence being associated 
with risk-taking, once they implement related strategies to account for endogeneity concerns. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the positive association between firms with greater 
female presence and accounting quality being driven by discrimination against women in the 
access to corporate board seats. The results are also consistent with our expectation that better 
governed firms provide better quality accounting numbers and also hire more women directors. 
Finally, they are also consistent with female directors, per se, not exerting better monitoring over 
the financial reporting process, in line with the work of Eagly and Johnson (1990), Croson and 
Gneezy (2009), Gneezy et al. (2009) and Adams and Funk (2012) who argue that observed 
behavioral differences across genders do not apply to high profile positions. 
4.1. Gender biases and earnings quality 
In our first test we show a positive association between the presence of independent female 
directors and earnings quality (as shown in Table 3). We interpret this as evidence of 
discrimination because this association disappears once we focus on non-discriminating sub-
samples (Tables 5 and 6). To further substantiate this claim, we look directly at the potential 
negative consequences of gender biases. In particular, we identify two settings where biases are 
likely present: 1) situations of obvious gender discrimination, where firms have no women on the 
board while having a high ex-ante probability of having female directors; and 2) situations where 
tokenism is likely to take place, where firms have exactly one female on the board while having 
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a low ex-ante probability of having female directors. If gender biases lead to sub-optimal 
appointments, higher levels of earnings management would be expected for these firms.  
To capture gender biases, we first define GenderBias_Disc, which takes the value of 1 if 
the firm does not have a female director, but it has an extremely high probability of having 
female directors (above percentile 95); zero otherwise. GenderBias_Disc captures situations in 
which a firm would be predicted to have female directors, but none are present, potentially 
signaling the existence of gender biases in the appointment of directors. We use model (2) to 
predict the probability of female board presence. Second, we look at a different gender bias-
related problem: potential tokenism. Tokens can be defined as groups that, within a given 
organization, are underrepresented (Kanter, 1977). Even with the increase in the number of 
women in top executive positions in the last decades, relatively recent research still considers 
women managers as tokens (Daily et al., 1999). To study this issue, we focus on the set of firms 
that have at least one female director (by construction, firms without women directors cannot 
suffer this problem). As noted in Adams and Ferreira (2009, p. 291) the presence of only one 
female director is usually regarded as evidence of tokenism. We create GenderBias_Tokenism, 
which takes the value of 1 if the firm has only one female director on the board and a low 
probability of having a female director; zero otherwise. The intuition behind this proxy is that in 
firms with a low probability of having female directors and with exactly one female director, this 
female director could be a token director.  
Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here 
The results from the first analysis, for the full sample, are presented in Table 7. Consistent 
with our expectations, we find a positive and significant coefficient on GenderBias_Disc 
(coeff=0.056, t-stat=1.89), indicating that gender discrimination is associated with greater 
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earnings management, and thus, lower earnings quality. The results from our second analysis are 
presented in Table 8. We define GenderBias_Tokenism using two different thresholds: when the 
probability of having a female director is in the lowest quartile of the distribution 
(GenderBias_Tokenism25) and when the probability of having a female director is below the 
median (GenderBias_Tokenism50). We find a positive and significant GenderBias_Tokenism in 
both cases, indicating that; overall, gender discrimination is associated with greater earnings 
management. Across all model specifications, we still find a negative and significant coefficient 
on NED, consistent with the prior findings and theory. Overall, the evidence reported in Tables 7 
and 8 supports our predictions and is consistent with discrimination in board selection processes 
potentially leading to sub-optimal monitoring. 
 
5. Robustness tests  
5.1. Heckman (1979) two stage approach 
As a robustness check, we implement a Heckman (1979) two stage approach where we first 
model the decision to hire a woman director, and then, estimate the relation between ABS_DAX 
and Fem_in_NED. After controlling in the first stage for the determinants of the appointment of 
female directors, we expect that, in the second stage, we will not find a relation between 
ABS_DAX and Fem_in_NED. To model the decision to appoint women directors we use model 
(2). In the second stage we introduce the inverse of the Mills ratio obtained from model (2) into 
model (1). Among the explanatory variables in the first stage we include the overall percentage 
of female employees at all levels of the organization. This variable is expected to affect the 
hiring of female directors (Hillman et al., 2007), and is excluded from the second stage, as it is 
not expected to affect the dependent variable in the second stage (discretionary accruals). This 
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exclusion restriction is the one followed by Srinidhi et al. (2011), who also implement this 
approach to control for endogeneity. The results of the second stage are in line with our previous 
tests, in that female directors play no different role than male directors in monitoring the 
financial reporting process. The coefficient on Fem_in_NED is not significant at conventional 
levels (coeff=-0.013, z-stat= -1.14). The coefficient on the inverse of the Mills’ ratio is 
significant (coeff= 0.024, z-stat= 4.02). This is consistent with our theoretical development. 
Regarding the rest of controls, the results are in line with those reported in Table 3. In particular, 
the percentage of independent directors is, as expected, significantly negative (coeff=-0.027, z-
stat=-1.79), return on assets is negative and significant (coeff=-0.100, z-stat=-5.35) and the 
market to book ratio is positive and significant (coeff=0.005, z-stat=3.30). Regarding the results 
from the first stage, they are extremely similar to those reported in Table 4.
11
 
5.2. Alternative sample 
In our main tests the sample starts in 2003. This is the year of issuance of the Higgs (2003) 
report. We do not believe that the Higgs report is a strong affirmative policy. However, we 
cannot discard completely that it led to the hiring of inexperienced or inadequate women to 
board positions. This was the case of the Norwegian law on gender quotas for directors, a very 
strong affirmative policy, that as shown by Ahern and Dittmar (2012) led to suboptimal hiring. 
The hiring of inexperienced women to boards of directors could be a contributing factor leading 
to our findings of no effect of women over the quality of accounting numbers. If this was the 
case in the UK, it would not be clear whether our findings would also hold in an institutional 
framework without affirmative actions. Given this, and as a robustness test, we replicate our 
                                                 
11
 We use a Logit estimation in Table 4. For the Heckman first stage we use a Probit estimation. The only minor 
differences between the results of the first stage and the results from Table 4 arise because of the different estimation 
methods and do not affect the inferences. 
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main findings using a sample prior to the issuance of the Higgs report. In particular, we focus on 
the period 1997-2002. For this period, we follow exactly the same data collection processes as in 
our main tests, but with the particularity that we use information on board characteristics from 
the Manifest database, and financial statements information from DataStream.
12
 This alternative 
sample contains 2,411 firm-year observations. The average number of yearly observations is in 
line with that of the main sample, and the descriptive statistics are, for most of the variables 
considered, remarkably similar, albeit the average percentage of females on boards is lower 
during that period, at 18%. Using this new sample, in unreported tests, we are able to replicate all 
of the main results, and inferences are not altered. The only difference with the main results is 
that, given that the new sample is almost half of the one that we use in the main tests, the sub-
samples in Table 5 are quite small (around 500 observations) and the significance levels of some 
of the control variables are substantially reduced. Finally, we also obtain very similar results 
when using the Heckman (1979) two stage approach. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
We examine whether female directors improve the monitoring role of the board over the 
financial reporting system. In particular, we study whether a larger percentage of women among 
independent directors contributes to improving the quality of accounting numbers, and whether 
this relation is moderated by gender discrimination in the access to corporate board seats. We 
build our work against the background of recent research that suggests that gender differences in 
performance that are present in the general population do not exist in high profile jobs (Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009; Gneezy et al., 2009; Adams and Funk, 2012; Sila et al., 2016). If males and 
                                                 
12
We use Manifest because of constraints in the access to the data in these early years in BoardEx.  
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females behave similarly in high profile jobs, under no discrimination, the presence of women 
should have no effect over the monitoring exerted by corporate boards. However, prior evidence 
suggests that discrimination exists, and thus, we hypothesize that biases in the procedures 
leading to directors’ nomination and appointment can affect the association between the presence 
of female directors and accounting quality. 
Using a large sample of UK quoted companies, we show that the influence of female 
directors over the monitoring of the financial reporting process hinges crucially on whether they 
are independent. We show that the presence of executive women directors on the board of 
directors is not significantly associated with better quality accounting numbers, while the 
presence of independent women directors is. In a second set of tests, we use several simple 
strategies to control for the effects of gender biases in the access to board seats and fail to find 
evidence consistent with larger percentages of women among independent directors being 
significantly associated with improved accounting numbers. These results are consistent with the 
view that gender differences in preferences do not apply to women in top management positions. 
This is consistent with Sila et al. (2016), who study firm risk-taking and also fail to find evidence 
that female directors behave differently than male directors once endogeneity concerns are 
properly dealt with. Overall, the presence of independent directors appears to be the key 
characteristic to ameliorate the financial reporting process, regardless of gender. 
While our evidence does not speak directly to the recent regulatory emphasis on imposing 
gender quotas, it suggests gender discrimination is correlated with worse firm outcomes, as 
measured by greater earnings management. It is certainly an important avenue for future research 
to provide further evidence on what diversity mixes most benefit firms and the economy overall.  
 30 
References 
Adams, R.B. and D. Ferreira (2009), ‘Women in the Boardroom and their Impact on Governance 
and Performance’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 94, No. 2, pp. 291-309. 
Adams, R.B. and P. Funk (2012), ‘Beyond the Glass Ceiling: Does Gender Matter?’, 
Management Science, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 219-235.  
Adams, R.B., and T. Kirchmaier (2016), ‘Women on Boards in Finance and STEM Industries’, 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 106, No. 5, pp. 277-281. 
Adams, R.B. and V. Ragunathan (2015), ‘Lehman Sisters’, Working Paper, ECGI. 
Agnew, J., P. Balduzzi, and A. Sunden (2003), ‘Portfolio Choice and Trading in a Large 401(k) 
Plan’, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 1, pp. 193–215. 
Ahern, K.R. and A.K. Dittmar (2012), ‘The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm 
Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
127, No.1, 137-97. 
Armstrong, C.S., J.E. Core and W.R. Guay (2014), ‘Do Independent Directors Cause 
Improvements in Firm Transparency?’ Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 113, No. 3, 383-
403. 
Armstrong, C.S., W.R. Guay and J.P. Weber (2010), ‘The Role of Information and Financial 
Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting’, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 50, Nos. 2&3, pp. 179-234. 
Barber, B. and T. Odean, T. (2001), ‘Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common 
Stock Investment’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol., 116, pp. 261–92. 
Barua, A., L.F. Davidson, D.V. Rama and S. Thiruvadi (2010), ‘CFO Gender and Accruals 
Quality’, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 25-39. 
Beaver, W.H. (1966), ‘Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure’, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 4, Empirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies 1966, pp. 71-111. 
Beekes, W., P.F. Pope and S. Young (2004), ‘The Link Between Earnings Timeliness, Earnings 
Conservatism and Board Composition: Evidence from the UK’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 
12, No. 1, pp. 47-51. 
Beneish, M.D. (1997), ‘Detecting GAAP Violation: Implications for Assessing Earnings 
Management among Firms with Extreme Financial Performance’, Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 271-309. 
Beyer, S. (1990), ‘Gender Differences in the Accuracy of Self-evaluations and Performance’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 59, pp. 960–70. 
Bilimoria, D. and S.K. Piderit (1994), ‘Board Committee Membership: Effects of Sex-Based 
Bias’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 1453-77. 
Bilimoria, D. and S.K. Piderit (2007), Handbook on women in business and management, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
 31 
Blum, T.C., D.L. Fields and J.S. Goodman (1994), ‘Organization-Level Determinants of Women 
in Management’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37, No.1, pp. 241-68. 
Brammer, S., A. Millington and S. Pavelin (2007), ‘Gender and Ethnic Diversity among UK 
Corporate Boards’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 393-403. 
Bugeja, M., Matolcsy, Z.P., and H. Spiropoulus (2012), ‘Is there a Gap in CEO Compensation?’, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 18, pp. 849-859. 
Burgstahler, D. and I. Dichev (1997), ‘Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and 
Losses’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 99-126. 
Carpenter, M.A., M.A. Geletkanycz and W.G. Sanders (2004), ‘Upper Echelons Research 
Revisited: Antecedents, Elements, and Consequences of Top Management Team 
Composition’, Journal of Management, Vol. 30, No. 6, pp. 749-78. 
Carter, D.A., F. D’Souza, B.J. Simkins and W.G. Simpson (2010), ‘The Gender and Ethnic 
Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance’, Corporate 
Governance, Vol. 18, No. 5, pp. 396-414. 
Carter, D.A., B.J. Simkins and W.G. Simpson (2003), ‘Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, 
and Firm Value’, Financial Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 33-53. 
Chen, J., W.S. Leung and M. Coergen (2017), ‘The Impact of Board Gender Composition on 
Dividend Payouts’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 43, pp. 86-105.  
Clatworthy, M. and M. Peel (2013), ‘The Impact of Voluntary Audit and Governance 
Characteristics on Accounting Errors in Private Companies’, Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 1-25. 
Conyon, M.J. and C. Mallin (1997), ‘Women in the Boardroom: Evidence from Large UK 
Companies’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 112-7. 
Conyon, M.J. and S.I. Peck (1998), ‘Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top 
Management Compensation’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 146-57. 
Croson, R. and U. Gneezy (2009), ‘Gender Differences in Preferences’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 448-74. 
Daily, C.M., S.T. Certo and D.R. Dalton (1999), ‘A Decade of Corporate Women: Some 
Progress in the Boardroom, None in the Executive Suite’, Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 93-9. 
Daniel N.D., D.J. Denis and L. Naveen (2008),  ‘Do Firms Manage Earnings to Meet Dividend 
Thresholds?’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 2-26. 
Deaves, R., E. Lüders and G.Y. Luo (2009), ‘An Experimental Test of the Impact of 
Overconfidence and Gender on Trading Activity,’ Review of Finance, Vol. 13, pp. 555–75 
Dechow, P.M., W. Ge and C. Schrand (2010), ‘Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of 
the Proxies, their Determinants and their Consequences’, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 50, Nos. 2&3, pp. 344-401. 
Dechow, P.M., R.G. Sloan and A.P. Sweeney (1995), ‘Detecting Earnings Management’, The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 193-225. 
 32 
Eagly, A.H. and B. Johnson (1990), ‘Gender and Leadership Style: A Meta-Analysis’, 
Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 233-56. 
Erhardt, E.L., J.D. Werbel and C.B. Shrader (2003), ‘Board Directors Diversity and Dirm 
Financial Performance’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 102-11. 
Faccio, M., M.T. Marchica and R. Mura (2016), ‘CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the 
efficiency of capital allocation’, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 39, pp. 193-209. 
Fama, E.F., and M.C. Jensen (1983), ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law and 
Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 319-37. 
Farrel, K.A., and P.L. Hersch (2005), ‘Additions to Corporate Boards: The Effect of Gender’, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 11, Nos. 1&2, pp. 85-106. 
Financial Reporting Council (2008), The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, London. 
Forbes, D.P. and F.J. Milliken (1999), ‘Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding 
Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision Making Groups’, Academy of Management Review, 
Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 489-505. 
García Lara, J.M., B. García Osma and F. Penalva (2009), ‘Accounting Conservatism and 
Corporate Governance’, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 161-201. 
Gneezy, U., K.L. Leonard and J.A. List (2009), ‘Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence 
from a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society’, Econometrica, Vol. 77, No. 5, pp. 1637-64. 
Gneezy, U., M. Niederle and A. Rustichini (2003), ‘Performance in Competitive Environments: 
Gender Differences’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No. 3, pp. 1049-74. 
Goldin, C. and C. Rouse (2000), ‘Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of ‘Blind’ Auditions on 
Female Musicians’, American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 715-41. 
Grosvold, J. and S. Brammer (2011), ‘National Institutional Systems as Antecedents of Female 
Board Representation: An Empirical Study’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 116-
35. 
Gul, F., B. Srinidhi and A.C. Ng (2011), ‘Does Board Gender Diversity Improve the 
Informativeness of Stock Prices?’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 
314-38. 
Hansen, J. (2010), ‘The Effect of Alternative Goals on Earnings Management Studies: An 
Earnings Benchmark Examination’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 29, No. 5 , 
pp. 459-80. 
Haslam, S.A. and M.K. Ryan (2008), ‘The Road to the Glass Cliff: Differences in the Perceived 
Suitability of Men and Women for Leadership Positions in Succeeding and Failing 
Organizations’, Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 530-46. 
Heckman, J. (1979), ‘The Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error’, Econometrica, Vol. 
47, No. 1, pp. 153-62. 
Higgs, D. (2003), Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors, Department 
of Trade and Industry, London. 
 33 
Hillman, A.J., C. Shropshire and A.A. Cannella (2007), ‘Organizational Predictors of Women on 
Corporate Boards’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 941-52. 
Holzer, H. and D. Neumark (1999), ‘Are Affirmative Action Hires Less Qualified? Evidence 
from Employer-Employee Data on New Hires’, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 17, No. 3, 
pp. 534-69. 
Holzer, H. and D. Neumark (2000), ‘Assessing Affirmative Action’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 483-568. 
Huang, J. and D.J. Kisgen (2013), ‘Gender and Corporate Finance: Are Male Executives 
Overconfident Relative to Female Executives?’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 108, 
pp. 822-839. 
Hutchinson, M., J. Mack and K. Plastow (2015), ‘Who Selects the ‘Right’ Directors? An 
Examination of the Association Between Board Selection, Gender Diversity, and Outcomes’, 
Accounting and Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 1071-103. 
Hyde, J.S., S.M. Lindberg, M.C. Linn, A.B. Ellis and C.C. Williams (2008), ‘Gender Similarities 
Characterize Math Performance’, Science, Vol. 321, No. 5888, pp. 494-5. 
Jensen, M.C. (1993), ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems’, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 831-80. 
Jones, J.J. (1991), ‘Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations’, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 193-228. 
Joshi, A. and H. Roh (2009), ‘The Role of Context in Work Team Diversity Research: A Meta-
Analytic Review’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 52, No 3, pp. 559-627. 
Kanter, R.M. (1977), Men and women of the corporation, Basic Books, New York. 
Klein, A. (2002), ‘Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings 
Management’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 375-400. 
Khurana, I.K. and K.K. Raman (2004), ‘Litigation Risk and the Financial Reporting Credibility 
of Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 Audits: Evidence from Anglo-American Countries’, The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, pp. 473-95. 
Kothari, S.P., A.J. Leone and C.E. Wasley (2005), ‘Performance Matched Discretionary 
Accruals Measures’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 163-97. 
Krishnan, G.V. and L.M. Parsons (2008), ‘Getting to the Bottom Line: An Exploration of Gender 
and Earnings Quality’, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 78, Nos. 1&2, pp. 65-76. 
Kulich, C., G. Trojanowski, M.K. Ryan, S.A. Haslam and L.D.R. Renneboog (2011), ‘Who Gets 
the Carrot and Who Gets the Stick? Evidence of Gender Disparities in Executive 
Remuneration’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 301-21. 
Lee, P.M. and E.H. James (2007), ‘She’-E-OS: Gender Effects and Investor Reactions to the 
Announcement of Top Executive Appointments’, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 28, 
No. 3, pp. 227-41. 
Leuz, C., D.J. Nanda and P.D. Wysocki (2003), ‘Earnings Management and Investor Protection: 
An International Comparison’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 505–27. 
 34 
Levi, M., K. Li, and F. Zhang. (2010), ‘Deal or No Deal: Hormones and the Mergers and 
Acquisitions Game’, Management Science, Vol. 56, No. 9, pp. 1462-1483. 
Levi, M., K. Li, and F. Zhang. (2014), ‘Director Gender and Mergers and Acquisitions’, Journal 
of Corporate Finance, Vol. 28, pp. 185-200. 
Lundeberg, M. A., P.W., Fox, and J. Punccohar (1994), ‘Highly Confident but Wrong: Gender 
Differences and Similarities in Confidence Judgments‘, Journal of Educational Psychology, 
Vol. 86, pp. 114–21. 
Mateos de Cabo, R., R. Gimeno and L. Escot (2011), ‘Disentangling Discrimination in Spanish 
Boards of Directors’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 77-95. 
Matsa, D.A., and A. R. Miller (2013), ‘A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from 
Quotas’, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 136-169. 
McNichols, M.F. (2000), ‘Research Design Issues in Earnings Management Studies’, Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4&5, pp. 313-45. 
Meyer, J. and B. Rowan (1977) ‘Institutional Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 340-63. 
Nosek, B.A., F.L. Smyth, M. Sriram, N.M. Lindner, T. Devos, A. Ayala, Y. Bar-Anan, R. Bergh, 
H. Cai, K. Gonsalkorale, S. Kesebir, N. Maliszewski, F. Neto, E. Olli, J. Park, K. Schnabel, 
K. Shiomura, B.T. Tulbure, R.W. Wiers, M. Somogyi, N. Akrami, B. Ekehammar, M. 
Vianello, M.R. Banaji, A.G. Greenwald (2009), ‘National Differences in Gender–Science 
Stereotypes Predict National Sex Differences in Science and Math Achievement’, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 106, No. 26, pp. 10.593-7. 
Owens, E., J.S. Wu and J. Zimmerman (2016), ‘Idiosyncratic Shocks to Firm Underlying 
Economics and Abnormal Accruals’, Working Paper (University of Rochester). 
Peasnell, K.V., P.F. Pope and S. Young (2005), ‘Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: 
Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?’ Journal of Business, Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 32, Nos. 7&8, pp. 1311-46. 
Peni, E. and S. Vahamaa (2010), ‘Female Executives and Earnings Management’, Managerial 
Finance, Vol. 36, No. 7, pp. 629-45. 
Petersen, M.A. (2009), ‘Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing 
Approaches’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 435-80.  
Rose, C. (2007), ‘Does Female Board Representation Influence Firm Performance? The Danish 
Evidence’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 404-13. 
Ryan M.K. and S.A. Haslam (2005), ‘The Glass Cliff: Evidence that Women are Over-
Represented in Precarious Leadership Positions’, British Journal of Management, Vol. 16, 
No. 2, pp. 81-90. 
Ryan M.K. and S.A. Haslam (2007), ‘The Glass Cliff: Exploring the Dynamics Surrounding the 
Appointment of Women to Precarious Leadership Positions’, Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 549-6. 
 35 
Sapienza, P., L. Zingales and D. Maestripieri (2009), ‘Gender Differences in Financial Risk 
Aversion and Career Choices are Affected by Testosterone’, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, Vol. 106, No. 36, pp. 15268-73. 
Sila, V., A. Gonzalez and J. Hagendorff (2016), ‘Women on Board: Does Boardroom Gender 
Diversity Affect Firm Risk?’ Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 36, pp. 26-53. 
Singh, V. and S. Vinnicombe (2004), ‘Why So Few Women Directors in Top UK Boardrooms? 
Evidence and Theoretical Explanations’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 479-88. 
Skinner, D.J. and R.G. Sloan (2002), ‘Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations, and Stock 
Returns, or Don’t Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink your Portfolio’, Review of Accounting 
Studies, Vol. 7, Nos. 2&3, pp. 289-312. 
Srinidhi, B., F.A. Gul and J. Tsui (2011), ‘Female Directors and Earnings Quality’, 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 1610-44. 
Watts, R.L. and J. Zimmerman (1986), Positive Accounting Theory, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Wenneras, C. and A. Wold (1997), ‘Nepotism and Sexism in Peer Review’, Nature, Vol. 387, 
No. 6631, pp. 341-3. 
Westphal, J.D. and I. Stern (2006), ‘The Other Pathway to the Boardroom: Interpersonal 
Influence Behavior as a Substitute for Elite Credentials and Majority Status in Obtaining 
Board Appointments’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 169-204. 
Westphal, J.D. and I. Stern (2007), ‘Flattery Will Get You Everywhere (Especially if You Are a 
Male Caucasian): How Ingratiation, Boardroom Behavior, and Demographic Minority Status 
Affect Additional Board Appointments at U.S. Companies’, Academy of Management 
Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 267-88. 
Xie, B., W.N. Davidson and P.J. DaDalt (2003), ‘Earnings Management and Corporate 
Governance: The Role of the Board and the Audit Committee’, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 295-316. 
Young, S. (2000), ‘The Increasing Use of Non-Executive Directors: Its Impact on UK Board 
Structure and Governance Arrangements’, Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, Vol. 
27, Nos. 9&10, pp. 1311-42. 
Zelechowski, D. and D. Bilimoria (2004), ‘Characteristics of Women and Men Corporate Inside 
Directors’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 337-42. 
 36 
TABLE 1: Descriptive Evidence 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of main variables 
Variable definition Variable Mean p25 Median p75 Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Natural log of market cap. FirmSize 10.878 9.199 10.391 12.428 2.335 4.012 18.267 
         
Return on assets ROA -0.015 -0.047 0.033 0.074 0.168 -0.838 0.300 
         
Market return Ret 0.091 -0.333 -0.003 0.347 0.630 -0.884 3.390 
         
Total accruals Tacc -0.054 -0.100 -0.044 -0.002 0.111 -0.556 0.456 
         
Absolute discretionary accruals Abs_DAX 0.080 0.022 0.052 0.107 0.083 0.000 0.489 
         
% of non-executive directors NED 0.532 0.429 0.538 0.667 0.159 0.000 1.000 
         
Board size BoardSize 6.609 5.000 6.000 8.000 2.297 2.000 19.000 
         
Directors’ Qualifications Dir. Qualifications 1.510 1.000 1.500 2.000 0.674 0.000 5.400 
         
Directors’ Appointments 
Board Appointments 
Dir. Appointments 2.813 1.778 2.500 3.571 1.426 1.000 14.750 
         
Number of Female directors Fem_tot 0.421 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.698 0.000 4.000 
         
N. of independent female 
directors 
Fem_in 0.264 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.558 0.000 4.000 
         
N. of executive female directors Fem_ex 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.422 0.000 4.000 
         
% of women on the board Fem_percent 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.097 0.000 0.600 
         
% of independent female 
directors among total board 
members 
Fem_in_board 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.444 
         
% of executive female directors 
among total board members 
Fem_ex_board 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.600 
         
% of women among independent 
directors 
Fem_in_NED 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.121 0.000 1.000 
         
Total Assets Size 1.176 0.013 0.049 0.323 4.744 0.000 77.320 
         
Market to book ratio Market-to-book 1.143 0.413 0.744 1.310 1.507 0.006 29.538 
         
Dummy firms with losses Loss_Dummy 0.342 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 
         
Dummy very small profit Small_Profits 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.198 0.000 1.000 
         
Dividend payout ratio Div_Payout 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.408 4.350 -156 105 
         
Female Employment FemaleEmployment 0.315 0.236 0.276 0.439 0.128 0.106 0.799 
         
Firm Age Firm age 28.585 7.000 15.000 36.000 31.699 1.000 199 
         
Concentration Ratio CR 0.060 0.001 0.006 0.040 0.141 0.000 0.996 
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED) 
Panel B: Proportion of UK firms with at least one woman on their boardrooms. 
 
The sample consists of 4,785 firm-year observations for the period 2003 – 2012. FirmSize is the natural 
logarithm of Market Capitalization. ROA is Return on assets. Ret is the rate of return over the fiscal year. Tacc is 
total accruals deflated by lagged total assets. We calculate total accruals as Δ(CA-CASH)-Δ(CL-STDEBT)-
(DA), where CA is total current assets, CASH is total cash and equivalents, CL is total current liabilities, 
STDEBT is total short term debt, DA is total depreciation, amortization and depletion. Abs_DAX is the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals, calculated as the residual of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals 
model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals. Ned is the percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board. BoardSize is the size of the board of directors. Dir. Qualifications is the average number of qualifications 
at undergraduate level and above for all the directors. Dir. Appointments is the average number of companies 
that a director serves. Fem_percent is the percentage of women on the board. Fem_in_board is the percentage of 
women independent directors among the total number of directors. Fem_ex_board is the percentage of women 
executive directors among the total number of directors. Fem_in_NED is the percentage of women among 
independent directors. Total assets is total assets, the market to book ratio is the market capitalization of the 
firm divided by total assets. Loss_Dummy is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reported a loss in 
the current year, and zero otherwise. Small_Profit is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports 
very small profits (less than one percent of total assets). Female employment is the % of female employees in a 
given industry over the total number of employees in the industry, as reported by United Kingdom Statistics 
Authority. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. The concentration ratio is firm sales divided 
by total sales of the whole industry where the firm operates. We take industries at the NACE2 two-digits level. 
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TABLE 2  
Correlation Matrix 
  
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) (t) 
(a) FirmSize 1.00 
                   (b) ROA 0.37 1.00 
                  (c) Ret 0.14 0.17 1.00 
                 (d) TACC 0.07 0.24 0.07 1.00 
                (e) Abs_DAX -0.20 -0.23 -0.01 -0.24 1.00 
               (f) NED 0.41 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.09 1.00 
              (g) BoardSize 0.71 0.23 0.04 0.04 -0.13 0.28 1.00 
             (h) Fem_percent 0.18 0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.16 1.00 
            (i) Fem_in_board 0.37 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.26 0.29 0.68 1.00 
           (j) Fem_ex_board -0.11 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.16 -0.07 0.70 -0.04 1.00 
          (k) Fem_in_NED 0.30 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.16 0.24 0.66 0.96 -0.03 1.00 
         (l) Qualifications 0.41 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.36 0.30 0.09 0.20 -0.07 0.15 1.00 
        (m) Appointments 0.37 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.40 0.19 0.08 0.18 -0.07 0.13 0.31 1.00 
       (n) Total Assets 0.53 0.12 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.25 0.47 0.15 0.25 -0.05 0.19 0.30 0.27 1.00 
      (o) Market-to-book 0.10 -0.13 0.19 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.03 1.00 
     (p) Loss_Dummy -0.39 -0.71 -0.18 -0.21 0.20 -0.06 -0.24 -0.07 -0.09 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.14 0.07 1.00 
    (q) Small_Profits -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.15 1.00 
   (r) Div_Payout 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.12 0.17 1.00 
  (s) FemEmploym -0.08 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.09 -0.16 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 1.00 
 (t) Firm age 0.24 0.19 0.03 0.05 -0.14 0.12 0.20 0.03 0.13 -0.08 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.08 -0.13 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.13 1.00 
(u) Conc. Ratio 0.60 0.18 0.02 0.01 -0.13 0.29 0.50 0.15 0.26 -0.05 0.20 0.32 0.29 0.56 -0.04 -0.20 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.14 
The sample consists of 4,785 firm-year observations for the period 2003 – 2012. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 10% level 
or better. 
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TABLE 3 
Regressions of absolute value of discretionary accruals on female participation on the board and controls 
 Expected 
Sign 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
      
Fem_in_NED (% women among indep. directors) - -0.019*    
  (-1.80)    
Fem_in_board (% women indep. over total board) -  -0.039**   
   (-2.20)   
Fem_percent (% women over total board members) ?   -0.012  
    (-0.87)  
Fem_ex_board (% women execs. over total board) ?    0.011 
     (0.51) 
NED (% of indep. Direc.) - -0.020* -0.018* -0.021** -0.020** 
  (-1.95) (-1.76) (-2.07) (-1.99) 
BSizeDum - -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
  (-2.05) (-2.03) (-2.11) (-2.17) 
Dir. Qualifications - -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* 
  (-1.78) (-1.76) (-1.83) (-1.86) 
Dir. Appointments - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.20) (-1.18) (-1.22) (-1.24) 
ROA ? -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 
  (-5.35) (-5.33) (-5.34) (-5.37) 
Size  ? -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.86) (-0.74) (-0.98) (-1.08) 
Market-to-Book + 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
  (2.47) (2.46) (2.48) (2.51) 
Loss_Dummy + 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
  (2.83) (2.82) (2.86) (2.86) 
Small_Profits + -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
  (-1.24) (-1.24) (-1.23) (-1.25) 
Div_Payout ? -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.05) (-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.07) 
Constant  0.092*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 
  (11.70) (11.53) (11.82) (11.67) 
      
Observations  4,785 4,785 4,785 4,785 
R-squared  0.074 0.074 0.073 0.073 
The sample consists of 4,785 firm-year observations for the period 2003-2012. We calculate discretionary accruals 
as the absolute value of the residuals of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 
1995), as applied to total accruals. NED is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. BSizeDum is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the board size is between 5 and 12 members. Fem_percent is the percentage 
of women on the board. Fem_in_board is the percentage of women independent directors among the total number of 
directors. Fem_ex_board is the percentage of women executive directors among the total number of directors. 
Fem_in_NED is the percentage of women among independent directors. Controls include profitability (ROA), size 
(total assets), the market to book ratio, a dummy variable identifying firms with losses (Loss_Dummy), a dummy 
variable identifying firms with very small profits (less than one percent of total assets) (Small_Profits), the dividend 
pay-out ratio (Div_Payout), the average number of board members’ qualifications (Dir. Qualifications) and other 
board appointments (Dir. Appointments) and year dummies. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 4 
Logit model: Probability of hiring female board members 
Dependent variable: 0/1 (At least one woman director) 
 Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(Z-Stat) 
Odds ratio 
    
Firm Size   + 0.139*** 1.149*** 
  (5.74)  
Board Size + 0.236*** 1.267*** 
  (10.92)  
Female Employment + 3.177*** 23.986*** 
  (11.97)  
Regulated + -0.005 0.995 
  (-0.03)  
Firm age ? -0.000 1.000 
  (-0.39)  
Market to book ratio ? -0.048* 0.953* 
  (-1.74)  
ROA - 0.018 1.018 
  (0.073)  
Market Return - -0.120* 0.887* 
  (-1.69)  
Concentration Ratio ? 0.815*** 2.258*** 
  (2.72)  
Constant  -5.125*** 0.006*** 
  (-18.45)  
    
Observations  4,785 4,785 
Year FE  YES YES 
The sample consists of 4,785 firm-year observations for the period 2003-2012. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of 
market capitalization. Board Size is the number of board members. Female Employment is the percentage of female 
employees in each industry/year, as reported by the UK Statistics Authority. Regulated is whether the firm pertains 
to a regulated industry. Firm age is the age of the firm measured from the IPO date. The market to book ratio is the 
market capitalization of the firm divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets. Market return is the rate of return 
of the firm over the fiscal year. Concentration ratio is firm sales divided by the total sales of the whole industry 
where the firm operates. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Panel A: Comparison of Board characteristics for three subsamples of firms that do not discriminate against women 
in the appointment of directors versus rest of the sample 
 
 Sample I Sample II Sample III 
 Non-Discr. Discr. diff. Non-Discr. Discr. diff. Non-Discr. Discr. diff. 
Fem_in_NED 0.121 0.000 0.121 0.173 0.000 0.173 0.156 0.000 0.156 
Fem_in_board 0.071 0.000 0.071 0.102 0.000 0.102 0.092 0.000 0.092 
Fem_percent 0.126 0.000 0.126 0.180 0.000 0.180 0.162 0.000 0.162 
Fem_ex_board 0.054 0.000 0.054 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.070 0.000 0.070 
BSizeDum 0.876 0.780 0.096 0.880 0.798 0.082 0.804 0.836 -0.032 
NED 0.557 0.510 0.047 0.563 0.517 0.046 0.550 0.522 0.028 
Dir. Qualifications 1.603 1.430 0.173 1.647 1.444 0.203 1.615 1.451 0.163 
Dir. Appointments 3.012 2.639 0.373 3.060 2.694 0.366 3.000 2.707 0.293 
Observations 2,225 2,560  1,552 3,233  1,721 3,064  
 
Panel B: Firm time-series distribution by sample and descriptive evidence of absolute value of discretionary accruals by discriminating and non-
discriminating samples I, II and III. 
 
Sample I 
 
Sample II 
 
Sample III 
 
% of 
Non-
Discr. 
firms 
ABS_DAX 
 
% of 
Non-
Discr. 
firms 
ABS_DAX 
 
% of 
Non-
Discr. 
firms 
ABS_DAX 
FYR 
Non-
Discr. Discr. diff. 
 
Non-
Discr. Discr. diff. 
 
Non-
Discr. Discr. diff. 
2003 47.10 0.079 0.077 0.00 
 
30.80 0.086 0.074 0.01 
 
35.51 0.091 0.071 0.02 
2004 44.04 0.070 0.103 -0.03 
 
27.83 0.072 0.094 -0.02 
 
35.47 0.088 0.088 0.00 
2005 47.12 0.077 0.093 -0.02 
 
30.09 0.078 0.088 -0.01 
 
37.17 0.078 0.089 -0.01 
2006 48.17 0.071 0.094 -0.02 
 
32.93 0.071 0.088 -0.02 
 
35.57 0.071 0.089 -0.02 
2007 44.96 0.080 0.093 -0.01 
 
29.60 0.076 0.092 -0.02 
 
33.60 0.079 0.091 -0.01 
2008 47.34 0.072 0.089 -0.02 
 
32.81 0.075 0.084 -0.01 
 
35.47 0.082 0.080 0.00 
2009 46.74 0.069 0.078 -0.01 
 
31.80 0.073 0.074 0.00 
 
35.29 0.076 0.072 0.00 
2010 46.72 0.068 0.082 -0.01 
 
34.12 0.071 0.078 -0.01 
 
36.47 0.074 0.076 0.00 
2011 46.15 0.063 0.085 -0.02 
 
37.03 0.058 0.085 -0.03 
 
38.28 0.061 0.083 -0.02 
2012 45.79 0.054 0.083 -0.03 
 
38.42 0.056 0.078 -0.02 
 
38.95 0.059 0.077 -0.02 
The sample consists of 4,785 firm-year observations for the period 2003 – 2012. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Bold numbers indicate significant 
difference at the 5 percent level or better. 
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TABLE 5 
Panel C: Regressions of absolute value of discretionary accruals on Fem_in_NED (% of women among independent directors) and controls for two 
different samples of firms that do not discriminate against women in the access to directorships 
 Sample I Sample II Sample III 
 Non-Discr. Discr. Non-Discr. Discr. Non-Discr. Discr. 
       
Fem_in_NED -0.002  -0.015  -0.018  
 (-0.14)  (-1.03)  (-1.30)  
NED (% of indep. Direc.) -0.033** 
(-2.21) 
-0.008 
(-0.55) 
-0.039** 
(-2.13) 
-0.011 
(-0.90) 
-0.034* 
(-1.91) 
-0.011 
(-0.84) 
       BSizeDum -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.013** -0.002 
 (-1.07) (-1.22) (-0.82) (-1.56) (-2.00) (-0.40) 
Dir. Qualifications -0.006* 
(-1.66) 
-0.002 
(-0.60) 
-0.005 
(-1.04) 
-0.003 
(-1.11) 
-0.001 
(-0.35) 
-0.005* 
(-1.73) 
       Dir. Appointments -0.001 
(-0.80) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.74) 
-0.003 
(-1.53) 
-0.000 
(-0.10) 
       ROA -0.110*** -0.065*** -0.110*** -0.075*** -0.091*** -0.078*** 
 (-4.16) (-3.48) (-3.52) (-4.37) (-3.23) (-4.35) 
Size  0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.61) (-2.23) (0.54) (-3.51) (-0.18) (-3.51) 
Market-to-Book 0.006*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.003* 0.003 0.003* 
 (4.10) (1.14) (2.82) (1.73) (1.30) (1.87) 
Loss_Dummy 0.008 0.013** 0.009 0.012** 0.010 0.012** 
 (1.27) (2.31) (1.19) (2.33) (1.40) (2.34) 
Small_Profits -0.017*** 0.003 -0.015** -0.003 -0.016** -0.001 
 (-3.08) (0.35) (-2.17) (-0.45) (-2.20) (-0.16) 
Div_Payout -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-1.27) (0.16) (-0.93) (0.13) (-0.77) (0.10) 
Constant 0.10*** 0.077*** 0.113*** 0.080*** 0.119*** 0.073*** 
 (8.47) (7.17) (7.23) (8.75) (8.18) (8.01) 
       
Observations 2,225 2,560 1,552 3,233 1,721 3,064 
R-squared 0.105 0.053 0.105 0.065 0.105 0.066 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
The sample consists of 4,785 firm-year observations for the period 2003-2012. Non-Discriminating (Non-Discr.) sample I consists of all firms that have at least 
one female director in their board during the considered sample period; if firms never have a female director during the sample period they are classified as 
discriminating (Discr.). Non-Discriminating (Non-Discr.) sample II consists of firm-year observations where there is a female director on the board; otherwise 
observations are classified as discriminating (Discr.). Non-Discriminating (Non-Discr.) sample III consists of all firm-year observations where there are female 
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directors on the board plus firm-year observations where there are no females on the board but the ex-ante probability of hiring a female director is low; 
otherwise firm-year observations are classified as discriminating (Discr.). We calculate discretionary accruals (ABS_DAX) as the absolute value of the residuals 
of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals. NED is the percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board. BSizeDum is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the board size is between 5 and 12 members. Fem_in_NED is the percentage of women 
among independent directors. Controls include the average number of board members’ qualifications (Dir. Qualifications) and other board appointments (Dir. 
Appointments), profitability (ROA), size (total assets), the market to book ratio, a dummy variable identifying firms with losses (Loss_Dummy), a dummy 
variable identifying firms with very small profits (less than one percent of total assets) (Small_Profits), the dividend pay-out ratio (Div_Payout), and year 
dummies. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Regressions of absolute value of discretionary accruals on Fem_percent (% of women among total directors) 
and controls for two different samples of firms that do not discriminate against women in the access to 
directorships 
 
Sample I 
Non-Discriminating 
Sample II 
Non-Discriminating 
Sample III 
Non-Discriminating 
Fem_percent 0.024 0.011 -0.008 
 (1.43) (0.41) (-0.33) 
NED (% of indep. Direc.) -0.032** 
(-2.11) 
-0.041** 
(-2.16) 
-0.037** 
(-2.04) 
    BSizeDum -0.006 -0.006 -0.014** 
 (-1.00) (-0.78) (-2.12) 
    Dir. Qualifications -0.006* 
(-1.73) 
-0.005 
(-1.10) 
-0.002 
(-0.42) 
    Dir. Appointments -0.001 
(-0.79) 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
-0.003 
(-1.54) 
    ROA -0.111*** -0.108*** -0.089*** 
 (-4.18) (-3.46) (-3.17) 
Size  0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.58) (0.64) (-0.21) 
Market-to-Book 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003 
 (4.05) (2.83) (1.33) 
Loss_Dummy 0.008 0.009 0.011 
 (1.25) (1.20) (1.44) 
Small_Profits -0.017*** -0.015** -0.016** 
 (-3.17) (-2.19) (-2.20) 
Div_Payout -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.28) (-0.99) (-0.82) 
Constant 0.098*** 0.110*** 0.121*** 
 (8.13) (6.47) (7.94) 
    
Observations 2,225 1,552 1,721 
R-squared 0.106 0.104 0.104 
Year FE YES YES YES 
The sample consists of 4,785 firm-year observations for the period 2003-2012. Non-Discriminating sample I 
consists of all firms that have at least one female director in their board during the considered sample period; if firms 
never have a female director during the sample period they are classified as discriminating. Non-Discriminating 
sample II consists of firm-year observations where there is a female director on the board; otherwise observations 
are classified as discriminating. Non-Discriminating sample III consists of all firm-year observations where there are 
female directors on the board plus firm-year observations where there are no females on the board but the ex-ante 
probability of hiring a female director is low; otherwise firm-year observations are classified as discriminating. We 
calculate discretionary accruals (ABS_DAX) as the absolute value of the residuals of the modified version of the 
Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals. NED is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. BSizeDum is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the board size is between 5 
and 12 members. Fem_in_NED is the percentage of women among independent directors. Controls include the 
average number of board members’ qualifications (Dir. Qualifications) and other board appointments (Dir. 
Appointments), profitability (ROA), Size (total assets), the market to book ratio, a dummy variable identifying firms 
with losses (Loss_Dummy), a dummy variable identifying firms with very small profits (less than one percent of 
total assets) (Small_Profits), the dividend pay-out ratio (Div_Payout), and year dummies. ***, **, and * represent 
1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Regressions of absolute value of discretionary accruals on NED (% of independent directors), Fem_in_NED 
(% of women among independent directors) and controls for Discrimination 
 Expected  
sign 
Coeff. 
(t-stat) 
Fem_in_NED - -0.020* 
  (-1.89) 
GenderBias_Disc + 0.056* 
  (1.89) 
GenderBias_Disc*NED - -0.115*** 
  (-2.93) 
NED (% of indep. Direc.) - -0.019* 
  (-1.85) 
BSizeDum - -0.008** 
  (-2.04) 
Dir. Qualifications - -0.004* 
  (-1.79) 
Dir. Appointments - -0.001 
  (-1.15) 
ROA ? -0.082*** 
  (-5.37) 
Size  ? -0.000 
  (-0.76) 
Market-to-Book + 0.003** 
  (2.45) 
Loss_Dummy + 0.012*** 
  (2.77) 
Small_Profits + -0.007 
  (-1.27) 
Div_Payout ? -0.000 
  (-0.05) 
Constant  0.092*** 
  (11.66) 
   
Observations  4,785 
R-squared  0.074 
Year FE  YES 
The sample covers the period 2003-2012. We calculate discretionary accruals as the absolute value of the residuals 
of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals. NED 
is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. GenderBias_Disc is a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if a firm has a high probability of hiring a female—probability above the 95th percentile—and has no women on 
the board. BSizeDum is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the board size is between 5 and 12 members. 
Fem_in_NED is the percentage of women among independent directors. Controls include the average number of 
board members’ qualifications (Dir. Qualifications) and other board appointments (Dir. Appointments), profitability 
(ROA), size (total assets), the market to book ratio, a dummy variable identifying firms with losses (Loss_Dummy), 
a dummy variable identifying firms with very small profits (less than one percent of total assets) (Small_Profits), the 
dividend pay-out ratio (Div_Payout), and year dummies. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, 
respectively.  
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TABLE 8 
Regressions of absolute value of discretionary accruals on Fem_in_NED (% of women among independent 
directors) and controls for Tokenism amongst firms with females 
 
Firms with at least one woman director 
Coeff. (t-stat) 
Fem_in_NED -0.013 -0.009 
 (-0.93) (-0.63) 
GenderBias_Tokenism25 0.014**  
 (2.16)  
   GenderBias_Tokenism50  0.013*** 
  (2.84) 
   NED (% of indep. Direc.) -0.034* 
(-1.82) 
-0.035* 
(-1.91) 
   BSizeDum -0.002 -0.004 
 (-0.26) (-0.60) 
Dir. Qualifications -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.88) (-0.69) 
Dir. Appointments -0.001 
(-0.58) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
ROA -0.103*** -0.102*** 
 (-3.26) (-3.22) 
   Size 0.000 0.000 
 (0.92) (1.05) 
Market-to-Book 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (2.59) (2.82) 
Loss_Dummy 0.008 0.008 
 (1.10) (1.10) 
Small_Profits -0.015** -0.015** 
 (-2.12) (-2.22) 
Div_Payout -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.82) (-0.81) 
Constant 0.102*** 0.099*** 
 (6.44) (6.26) 
   
Observations 1,552 1,552 
R-squared 0.110 0.111 
Year FE YES YES 
The sample covers the period 2003-2012. We calculate discretionary accruals as the absolute value of the residuals 
of the modified version of the Jones (1991) accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995), as applied to total accruals. NED 
is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. GenderBias_Tokenism25(50) is a dummy variable taking 
the value of 1 if a firm has a low probability of hiring a female—probability below the lowest 25th (50th) percentile 
within the group of firms with at least one female—and has only one female on the board. BSizeDum is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the board size is between 5 and 12 members. Fem_in_NED is the percentage of 
women among independent directors. Controls include the average number of board members’ qualifications (Dir. 
Qualifications) and other board appointments (Dir. Appointments), profitability (ROA), size (total assets), the 
market to book ratio, a dummy variable identifying firms with losses (Loss_Dummy), a dummy variable identifying 
firms with very small profits (less than one percent of total assets) (Small_Profits), the dividend pay-out ratio 
(Div_Payout), and year dummies. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. 
